\u3cem\u3eNew Jersey v. T.L.O.\u3c/em\u3e: School Searches and the Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Juvenile Delinquency and Criminal Proceedings by Stoddard, Bryan
Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 2011
Number 2 Symposium: The Impact of Same-Sex
Marriage on Education
Article 19
Fall 3-2-2011
New Jersey v. T.L.O.: School Searches and the
Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Juvenile
Delinquency and Criminal Proceedings
Bryan Stoddard
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Education Law Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryan Stoddard, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: School Searches and the Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Juvenile Delinquency and Criminal
Proceedings, 2011 BYU Educ. & L.J. 667 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2011/iss2/19
.
NEW JERSEY V. T.L. 0.: SCHOOL SEARCHES AND THE 
APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided New 
Jersey u. TL.O., 1 a landmark case interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 The basic 
holdings in the case were: first, the restrictions of the Fourth 
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures do 
apply to public school teachers and other school officials 
because they are state governmental actors for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment;3 second, the standard of reasonableness 
for searches performed by such school officials is a mere 
"reasonableness, under all the circumstances" test;4 and third, 
the school official's actions in the case did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 5 
Several subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the 
application of the Fourth Amendment in schools have cited 
T.L.O. or used the test it set forth, but there has been no 
modification to its core holdings.6 However, this is not because 
T.L. 0. did not leave open any unanswered questions or 
unresolved issues. Indeed, the Court in its TL.O. opinion 
intentionally left open and undecided several important issues. 
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. 325 (1985). 
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3. 'l'.L.O., 469 U.S. at i18il-i37. 
1. !d. at :l:37-43. 
5. /d. at 313-18. 
6. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009); Bd. of 
Educ. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss one of the issues that 
remains open and unanswered by the majority opinion: the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency or 
criminal proceedings when the evidence has been seized in a 
school, by a school official, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
This paper will proceed in the following manner. Part II 
will begin by providing a description of the T.L.O. case and its 
holdings as well as a summary of subsequent Supreme Court 
cases dealing with the Fourth Amendment's application in 
schools. Part III will provide a discussion of the exclusionary 
rule issue left open by the T.L. 0. opinion, specifically the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to juvenile delinquency 
and criminal proceedings for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment in school searches. Finally, Part IV will provide a 
conclusion. 
II. NEW JERSEY v. T.L. 0. 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to offer a detailed 
exposition of the facts and holdings from the T.L.O. case in 
order to understand what the open issues are and why they 
were deliberately left open by the Supreme Court in the 
opinion. As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment commands that searches and seizures be 
reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of the 
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the 
nature of the search or seizure itself."7 
A. Facts 
In 1980 at Piscataway High School in New Jersey, a 
teacher discovered two teenage girls smoking in a school 
restroom. 8 One of the two girls was fourteen-year-old T.L.O., a 
high school freshman at the time. 9 Smoking on school grounds 
was a violation of the school rules, so the teacher escorted the 
two girls to the office of the school's principal. 10 There they 
7. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 5ill, 5:17 (1985) (citing 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-42). 
8. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at :128. 
9. /d. 
10. ld. 
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were presented to the assistant vice principal, Theodore 
Choplick, who questioned the two girls about the alleged 
smoking in the restroom. 11 T.L.O.'s companion confessed to the 
violation, but T.L.O. denied the allegations, even asserting that 
she did not smoke at all. 12 
With T.L.O.'s bold denial, Mr. Choplick requested that she 
come into his private office. 13 There, Mr. Choplick demanded to 
see the purse T.L.O. was carrying. 14 Mr. Choplick then opened 
the purse and noticed a pack of cigarettes. 15 He removed the 
cigarettes from the purse and held them up to T.L.O. and 
accused her of lying to him. 16 Additionally, Mr. Choplick 
noticed when he was removing the cigarettes from the purse 
that there was also a package of cigarette rolling papers in the 
purse. 17 In Mr. Choplick's experience at the high school, 
possession of such rolling papers was consistently linked with 
marijuana use. 18 Therefore, Mr. Choplick became even more 
suspicious that T.L.O. was also involved in marijuana use, and 
that there would be more evidence of it in her purse. 19 He then 
engaged in a closer inspection of the purse and its contents.20 
In the purse, Mr. Choplick found a small amount of marijuana, 
a pipe, some empty plastic bags, a significant amount of one-
dollar bills, an index card with a list of "people who owe me 
money," and two letters that evidenced T.L.O.'s participation in 
marijuana dealing. 21 
With the discovery of this evidence, Mr. Choplick called 
T.L.O.'s mother and the police.22 Later, at the police station, 
T.L.O. confessed to having engaged in marijuana dealing at the 
high school. 23 Based on the evidence seized from the purse by 
Mr. Choplick and T.L.O.'s confession, the State brought 
11. !d. 
12. !d. 
18. /d. 
11. /d. 
15. !d. 
16. /d. 
17. /d. 
18. /d. 
19. /d. 
20. /d. 
21. ld. at :l47. 
22. !d. at :l28. 
23. !d. at :i29. 
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criminal delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile court.24 
T.L.O. filed a motion to suppress, asking that the evidence 
seized from her purse be excluded and that her confession be 
excluded because it was tainted by the illegally-seized 
evidence.25 
The trial court concluded that because the search was 
reasonable, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the 
evidence should not be suppressed.26 T.L.O. was found to be 
delinquent and was sentenced to one year of probation.27 
On appeal in the juvenile court case, the appellate division 
affirmed the trial court's determination on the Fourth 
Amendment question, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
reversed, holding that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment rights of T.L.O. and that the evidence should be 
suppressed according to the exclusionary rule.2R The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, holding, in essence, that there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation in the case.29 
B. Discussion 
Justice White's majority opinion notes that certiorari was 
originally granted in this case to answer the question of "the 
appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 
searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by 
public school authorities."30 However, upon consideration, the 
Court felt it would be wiser to first decide "what limits, if any, 
the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school 
authorities .... "31 Since the Court eventually decided that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation in the case, there 
was no need to address what remedy, if any, would be required 
in the event that there was a violation. 32 
The Court analyzed the Fourth Amendment by dividing the 
inquiry into three questions, and thus produced three linked 
21. !d. 
25. !d. 
26. State ex rel. T.L.O., 128 A.2d 1327, 1::33:3-.31 (Middlesex Cnty. Ct. 1980). 
27. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 3:30. 
28. ld. 
29. ld. at :317-18. 
30. !d. at 327. 
:31. ld. at 3:32. 
:32. Jd. at 3:3::3 n.:l. 
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holdings. The first and threshold-type question the Court 
answered was "whether [the Fourth] Amendment's prohibition 
on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches 
conducted by public school officials."33 Having answered that 
question in the affirmative, the next issue was "the inquiry into 
the standards governing such searches."34 The Court decided 
that school officials are not restricted by the Fourth 
Amendment in the same manner as law enforcement officers-
the standard in schools is a more relaxed, "reasonable grounds" 
test. 35 Having announced the new test, the Court analyzed the 
facts of the case in light of the newly announced standard and 
held that T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
when Mr. Choplick searched and seized the contents of her 
purse. 36 Each of the three parts of the Court's holding will be 
discussed in order. 
1. Public school officials are subject to the Fourth Amendment 
As indicated above, the first and preliminary question that 
the Court answered was whether public school officials are 
subject to the restrictions imposed on government by the 
Fourth Amendment. 37 Answering the question in the 
affirmative, the Court progressed through the inquiry in logical 
fashion. 38 
The Court began by acknowledging, first, the undisputed 
fact that the Fourth Amendment applies to States by virtue of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Second, the Fourteenth 
Amendment indisputably protects the constitutional rights of 
students from actions of public school officials: 
:c~::l. I d. at .13:3. 
:14. !d. at il:i7. 
35. !d. at ::>:i?-13. 
il6. ld. at il13-18. 
a7. ld. at 33il. 
il8. ld. at 3:3:3-il7. 
:39. I d. at :i34. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONS'!'. amend. IV,§ 1. The Fourth Amendment, and the accompanying remedy of 
the exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states by the Supreme Court in Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 64il (1961). 
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The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures~Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the 
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young 
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.40 
With these two foundational principles in place, the Court 
further acknowledged that while the history of the Fourth 
Amendment may suggest that it "was intended to regulate only 
searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers," 
the Court has never limited it to only police conduct.41 This is 
because "[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized 
in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy 
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials."42 
Furthermore, the public schools function not as an exercise 
of mere delegated parental authority, but as an exercise of 
state authority.43 This is supported by the "contemporary 
reality" of compulsory education laws and "publicly mandated 
educational and disciplinary policies.44 Thus, public school 
officials are state actors for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment; therefore they cannot claim parental immunity 
from the constitutional restrictions.45 
Additionally, the Court had previously held that school 
officials, as governmental actors, must comply with the 
requirements of free speech rights under the First 
Amendment,46 and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
40. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :i19 
U.S. 621, 637 (1943)). 
41. Jd. at 334-35. The Court noted that Fourth Amendment restrictions have 
been applied to other non-law enforcement governmental authorities. See, e.g., 
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S .. '307 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Act 
inspectors); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 199 (1978) (firemen); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 
U.S. 523 (1967) (building inspectors). 
42. T.L.O., 169 U.S. at il35 (quoting Camara, il87 U.S. at 528). 
43. Jd. at 336. 
14. Jd. (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 130 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)). 
15. Jd. at 336-37. 
16. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :i9il U.S. 503 (1969). 
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Amendment.47 Therefore, it would only make sense to require 
that public school officials, still functioning as governmental 
actors, also conform their actions to the privacy protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.48 
2. Standard governing school searches 
Having decided that the Fourth Amendment does apply to 
school officials, the Court then had to analyze the bigger 
question of what standards of reasonableness would apply to 
searches and seizures in public schools.49 With the "underlying 
command" of the Fourth Amendment being that searches and 
seizures must be reasonable, the Court established a standard 
of reasonableness to be applied in searches and seizures 
performed in public schools. The Court's determination of what 
is reasonable included a balancing test. 50 
Since what makes a search or seizure reasonable or not 
depends heavily on the context, the inquiry requires finding the 
proper balance between "the individual's legitimate 
expectations of privacy and personal security. . . [and] the 
government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches 
of the public order."51 ln this case, the privacy interest of the 
individual, T.L.O., was in her purse, a personal item that she 
carried with her. 52 The Court indicated that a student's 
expectation of privacy in such items of personal property was 
one that society would be "prepared to recognize as legitimate," 
a necessity to receive Fourth Amendment protection. 53 
However, on the government's side of the balancing test, the 
school has an "equally legitimate need to maintain an 
environment in which learning can take place."54 Given the 
significant competing considerations, the Court felt it 
necessary to ease somewhat the restrictions normally imposed 
by the Fourth Amendment. 55 
47. Goss v. Lopez, 119 U.S. 565 (1975). 
18. T.L.O., 169 U.S. at :l:l6. 
49. Id. at :3:37. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Jd. at ilil7-:l8. 
5il. Id. at il:J8-:l9 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). 
54. ld. at :110. 
55. Id. at il10-1il. 
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Thus, for the unique public school setting, the Court 
departed from the probable cause and warrant requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.56 This was for several stated reasons. 
The warrant requirement is ill-suited for the school 
environment because it "would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures 
needed in the schools."57 Additionally, the warrant requirement 
has been abandoned in other cases where "the burden of 
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental 
purpose behind the search."58 Furthermore, "[t]he fundamental 
command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and 
seizures be reasonable, and although 'both the concept of 
probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the 
reasonableness of a search, ... in certain limited circumstances 
neither is required."'59 Thus, the Court rationalized by stating, 
"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private 
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a 
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops 
short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a 
standard."60 
The Court then announced that the new standard for school 
searches would be simply a test of reasonableness under all the 
circumstances.61 This inquiry has two parts: "first, one must 
consider 'whether the ... action was justified at its inception;'62 
second, one must determine whether the search as actually 
conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place."'63 The first part of the test will be satisfied under 
ordinary circumstances "when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the 
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules 
56. ld. 
57. Id. at 340. 
58. ld. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33). 
59. ld. at 340-41 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United Statl,s, -11:1 U.S. 26G, 277 
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
60. Id. at ::l41. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. ()18 (1979); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (197G); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 87:3 
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (19()8). 
61. T.L.O., 169 U.S. at 311. 
G2. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
63. Id. 
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of the school."64 The second part of the test is satisfied "when 
the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives 
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."65 
Providing justification and support for its newly announced 
test, the Court stated: 
This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the 
efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools 
nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of 
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of 
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school 
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the 
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their 
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common 
sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should 
ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more 
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving 
order in the schools. 66 
Having announced the new reasonableness standard for 
school searches, the main question remaining was how it would 
be applied to the case at hand.67 
3. The search was reasonable 
Applying the "reasonable grounds" standard to the facts of 
the case, the Court concluded "that the search was in no sense 
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes."68 This case 
involved two distinct searches, and the first provided the basis 
for the second. 69 Therefore, "the validity of the search for 
marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial 
search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to 
suspect that T.L.O. possessed marihuana had the first search 
not taken place."70 Since T.L.O. had been accused of smoking 
but had denied it, the idea that she had cigarettes in her purse 
was not unreasonable.71 Accordingly, the Court also stated that 
61. !d. at :111-12. 
65. !d. at :112. 
66. !d. at :312-1:3. 
67. /d. at 84i1. 
68. /d. 
69. !d. at 34:1-11. 
70. /d. at :144. 
71. /d. at :316. 
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"it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when 
he examined T.L.O.'s purse to see if it contained cigarettes."72 
Since Mr. Choplick's suspicions of marijuana use were raised 
when he saw the package of rolling papers in plain sight just as 
he removed the cigarettes from the purse, his resulting 
examination of the contents of the purse for evidence of 
marijuana use was justified. 73 All of the evidence discovered 
upon further inspection of the purse was therefore seized 
reasonably, and none of T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when this evidence was used against her in the 
juvenile court delinquency charges.74 
C. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions on the Application of 
the Fourth Amendment in Schools 
Since the T.L.O. decision, twenty-five years of litigation has 
yielded only three Supreme Court cases dealing with the 
application of the Fourth Amendment in schools. 75 These cases 
did not modify the T.L. 0. standard. Indeed, only one of the 
cases contained the right set of circumstances that required the 
actual use of the "reasonable grounds" test.76 Additionally, 
none of the cases involved criminal-type charges against a 
student in juvenile court as did T.L.0.;77 all were civil rights 
lawsuits.78 Two of the cases were based on suspicionless 
searches, and the other was initially based on individualized 
reasonable suspicion. A brief examination of these cases serves 
to further show how and in what manner the Court has 
repeatedly treated school cases specially and differently than 
non-school cases for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
1. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
The first school search case post-T.L.O. was Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton, which was based on a 
72. Id. 
7::3. !d. at 34 7. 
74. !d. at 347-48. 
75. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 263:3 (2009); Bd. of Educ., 
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47.1 v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646 (1995). 
76. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633. 
77. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329. 
78. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638; Earls, 5:36 U.S. at 826-27; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 
651-52. 
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suspicionless search, in the "special needs" category of Fourth 
Amendment cases. 79 In the case, a school district, in an effort 
to curb the tide of drug use in its schools, instituted a policy of 
mandatory urine testing for all students participating in school 
sports. 80 The policy required the student and his or her parents 
to sign a consent form agreeing to the testing before the 
student could participate in any school sport. 81 A student 
(Acton) brought suit against the school district because he was 
denied the opportunity to play on a school football team 
because his parents would not agree to sign the consent form. 82 
Acton claimed that this policy was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The Court noted that the T.L. 0. decision made the Fourth 
Amendment applicable to school officials. 83 It was also noted 
that the public school context fell into the "special needs" 
category of the Fourth Amendment, thus reducing the level of 
suspiciOn required from probable cause to reasonable 
suspicion.84 However, instead of engaging in the actual 
"reasonable grounds" test articulated in T.L.O., the Court in 
Acton engaged in a balancing analysis of the privacy interest 
involved against the governmental interest. 85 While not 
explicitly stated, it seems that the "reasonable grounds" test 
was not used in Vernonia because the case involved a 
suspicionless search policy and not an actual search by a school 
official that had already taken place. 86 After weighing the 
minimal privacy interest students had and the minimal 
intrusion into those interests against the heavy interest the 
School District had in eradicating student drug use and the 
policy's reasonably effective means of meeting that interest, the 
Court found no Fourth Amendment violation and ruled in favor 
of the School District. 87 
79. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653. 
80. Jd. at 618-51. 
81. ld. 
82. !d. at 651-52. 
8il. Jd. at 652 (citing T.L.O., 169 U.S. at icl36-37). 
81. !d. at 65i3. 
85. !d. at 651-66. 
86. Cf id. at 653 (the search the Court approved of in T.L.O. was based on 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing). 
87. !d. at 651-66. 
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2. Board of Education, Pottawatomie County v. Earls 
The next case dealing with the Fourth Amendment in 
schools was Board of Education of Independent School District 
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,88 another suspicionless 
search case whose facts were strikingly similar to those in 
Vernonia. In Earls, the School Board implemented a policy that 
required all students who wished to participate in any 
competitive extracurricular activity to submit to drug testing.x9 
A student (Earls) who was a participant in several 
extracurricular activities, including show choir and marching 
band, brought an action against the school district. 90 Earls 
alleged that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment.91 
The Court ruled in favor of the school, and engaged in an 
analysis virtually identical to the Vernonia opinion. The first 
consideration was "the nature of the privacy interest allegedly 
compromised by the drug testing."92 The determination on this 
issue was that "[a] student's privacy interest is limited in a 
public school environment where the State is responsible for 
maintaining discipline, health, and safety. Schoolchildren are 
routinely required to submit to physical examinations and 
vaccinations against disease."93 
The next consideration was "the character of the intrusion 
imposed by the Policy."94 The Court determined that requiring 
students to produce a urine sample behind the closed door of a 
bathroom stall was "even less problematic" than the 
"negligible" intrusion in Vernonia. 95 Concluding the issue of the 
nature of the intrusion, the Court stated, "[g]iven the 
minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the 
limited uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that 
the invasion of students' privacy is not significant."96 
88. Bd. of Education of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. !';uris, 
536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
89. Earls, 536 U.S. at 825. 
90. ld. at 826-27. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. at 830. 
9:-l. I d. at 830-31 (italics omitted). 
91. I d. at 832. 
95. Id. at 832-33 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 17J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 
(1995)). 
96. Id. at 831. 
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As the final consideration in its analysis, the Court 
considered "the nature and immediacy of the government's 
concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting them.'197 For 
this analysis of the government's interest, the Court concluded 
by saying: 
we find that testing students who participate in 
extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of 
addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in 
preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use.. . . [W]e 
conclude that the drug testing . . . effectively serves the 
School District's interest in protecting the safety and health of 
its students. 98 
It is also significant to note in Earls the Court's response to 
the argument that the drug testing should be based only upon 
an "individualized reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing."99 
Rejecting that argument, the Court stated, "[i]n this context, 
the Fourth Amendment does not require a finding of 
individualized suspicion, and we decline to impose such a 
requirement on schools attempting to prevent and detect drug 
use by students." 100 While Earls had argued that requiring an 
individualized suspicion would be less intrusive, the Court 
questioned whether this would, in reality, be less intrusive. 101 
The Court suggested that such a requirement would result in 
an additional burden placed on teachers, who "might unfairly 
target members of unpopular groups," and could render the 
whole program ineffective due to "the fear of lawsuits resulting 
from targeted searches." 102 Furthermore, the Court pointed out 
that "reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not 
require employing the least intrusive means, because 'the logic 
of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could 
raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-
and-seizure powers."' 103 Additionally, the Court reiterated that 
"the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of 
97. /d. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660). 
98. !d. at 888. 
99. /d. at 837. 
100. /d. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
101. /d. 
102. /d. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663-61 (offering similar reasons for why 
"testing based on 'suspicion' of drug use would not be better, but worse")). 
108. /d. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 128 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976)). 
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[individualized] suspicion." 104 Indeed, "[i]n certain limited 
circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent 
or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is 
sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy 
entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of 
individualized suspicion." 105 
In summary, the Court reasoned that in the safety and 
administrative regulations context, departing from the 
probable cause requirement may be reasonable "when 'special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."' 106 
Therefore, the Court ruled that the drug testing policy was not 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and ruled in favor of the 
school district. 
3. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding 
In the only Supreme Court case since T.L.O. that involved 
an actual search of a student by a school official, the Court 
ruled in Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding that the 
"strip-search" of a student violated the Fourth Amendment. 107 
Using the two-part test articulated in T.L.O., the search was 
held to be excessive in its scope. 10x However, due to the lack of 
clearly established law on the subject of school strip-searches, 
the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity. 109 
In this case, Assistant Principal Kerry Wilson of Safford 
Middle School received information from two other students 
that Savana Redding, another student, was possibly in 
violation of school policy by having and/or distributing 
prescription strength and over-the-counter pain reliever 
pills. 110 Wilson confronted and questioned Redding, but she 
denied having ever given pills to another student and denied 
having any pills in her possession. 111 Wilson and another 
school official, Helen Romero, then searched Redding's 
104. Id. at 829 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561). 
105. ld. at 829 (quoting Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)). 
106. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 48:3 U.S. 868, 87:3 (1987)). 
107. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 26:33, 26il7-B8 (2009). 
108. !d. at 2639-43. 
109. ld. at 2643-44. 
110. ld. at 2638-41. 
111. ld. at 26:38. 
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backpack, but found nothing. 112 Wilson then instructed Romero 
to take Redding to the school nurse's office and search her 
clothes for pills. 113 Romero and the school nurse, Peggy 
Schwallier, then had Redding remove her clothes down to her 
bra and underwear. 114 Redding was then told to "pull her bra 
out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on 
her underpants .... "115 No pills were ever found. 116 Redding's 
mother subsequently filed suit on behalf of her daughter 
against the school district and the school officials involved. 117 
In its analysis of the facts of the case under the two-part 
reasonable-grounds test from T.L.O., the Court acknowledged 
that the search of Redding's backpack and outer clothing was 
justified at its inception due to the information Wilson had 
gathered from other students concerning Redding's 
involvement with pain pills. 118 However, once the search 
extended to the point where Redding was required to expose 
herself by shaking out her underwear, this degree of intrusion 
did not match the kind of suspicion Wilson had. 119 This was 
because there was no evidence whatsoever that would have 
indicated a chance that Redding had pills stuffed inside her 
underwear. 120 Additionally, "Wilson had no reason to suspect 
that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or 
that individual students were receiving great numbers of 
pills." 121 This indicated a lack of reason to believe that there 
was a "danger to the students from the power of the drugs or 
their quantity." 122 The Court thought "that the combination of 
these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search 
reasonable." 123 Therefore, the Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment rights of Redding had been violated. 124 
112. !d. 
11:3. !d. 
111. !d. 
115. !d. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. 
118. !d. at 2640-11. 
119. !d. at 2612. 
120. !d. at 2642-4:!. 
121. !d. at 2642. 
122. Id. at 2642-4il. 
12:1. !d. at 264:!. 
121. !d. at 26:!7. 
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The Court in Redding had no occasion to address the 
exclusionary rule question from T.L. 0. since there were no 
criminal proceedings. 125 Therefore, the exclusionary rule was 
inapplicable. 126 Thus, even after several school Fourth 
Amendment cases, the question concerning the contours of the 
application of the exclusionary rule in the school search context 
remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. However, these 
cases do provide some insight into how the Court typically 
treats school cases differently than other Fourth Amendment 
cases. 
Ill. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
This section will discuss the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency and criminal 
proceedings involving violations of the Fourth Amendment in 
schools. First, the cases that have dealt directly with the issue 
and have either applied or rejected the rule will be discussed. 
Second, a summary of the courts' rationales will be provided. 
Finally, additional discussion of the issue from scholarly 
sources will be provided. 
A. Cases That Have Applied the Exclusionary Rule 
Both before and after the T.L. 0. decision, most courts 
across the country have applied the exclusionary rule in the 
juvenile and criminal proceedings to evidence obtained in a 
school search or seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment. 
However, there are differences among the analyses engaged in 
and the rationales given by the various courts in the majority 
view. With no guidance from the Supreme Court as of yet, the 
manner in which to analyze the issue is virtually wide open. 
Of the reported cases in which the exclusionary rule was 
used to suppress the evidence obtained in schools in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, a handful of the courts have applied 
the rule without analysis of whether such application of the 
rule is appropriate. 127 Two courts have simply applied, without 
125. Id. at 2638. 
126. See United States v .• Janis, 428 U.S. 1::3::3 (1976). 
127. See Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 1971) (college dorm 
room); In reAppeal in Pima Cnty .• Juvenile Action No. 80181-1, 7:l:i P.2d :316, :l18 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); T .• J. v. State, 538 So. 2d 1:!20, 1:322 (Fla. Oist. Ct. App. 1989) 
(cites only to normal police cases for support); T.AO'B. v. State, 159 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 
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hesitation or analysis, specific state statutes that require 
suppression in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence 
seized illegally. 12x There are only a few cases containing some 
amount of analysis and rationale concerning the acceptance of 
the exclusionary rule for unconstitutional school searches 
resulting in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 129 
In Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified School District, a 
California Appellate Court carefully considered whether to 
apply the exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, and decided that it should apply. 130 The court 
determined that there was no good reason to treat school 
searches differently from other government searches when it 
comes to juvenile and criminal prosecutions. 131 Therefore, in 
the court's logic, since the Supreme Court has held that the 
Fourth Amendment is "applicable to attack evidence acquired 
in administrative searches and offered in criminal 
prosecutions," it should similarly be available in the context of 
school searches that result in juvenile prosecutions. 132 
Concluding its determination of the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule, the court gave this statement: 
While we concur with the idea that the Fourth Amendment 
and the exclusionary rule are not coextensive, we must 
disagree with a line of demarcation which would treat 
prosecuted high school students differently from any other 
defendant. It is no less offensive to the Constitution to permit 
the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence in a juvenile 
or criminal prosecution simply because the site of its 
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); A.B. v. State, 440 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. i\pp. 1983); M.J. v. 
State, 399 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. i\pp. 1981); State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 320 
(La. 1975); People v. D., i-358 N.Y.S.2d 40il, 410 (N.Y. 1974); People v. Bowers, 356 
N.Y.S.2d 4:-32,136 (N.Y. i\pp. Term 1971); People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 71:-l (N.Y. 
Dist. Ct. 1968) (college dorm room); In re Fisher, No. :-35:-375, 1977 Ohio App. LEXlS 
7:-380, at *7 (Ohio Ct. i\pp. 1977); Commonwealth v. Williams, 749 A.2d 957, 958 (!'a. 
Super. Ct. 2000); Dumas v. Pennsylvania, 515 i\.2d 981, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); 
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 i\.2d 271, 27 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970) (college dorm 
room). 
128. See Doe v. State, 540 P.2d 827, 831 (N.M. Ct. i\pp. 1975); Coronado v. State, 
8:-35 S.W.2d 6il6, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
129. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985); Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified Sch. 
Dist., 162 Cal. i\pp. 3d 5ii0 (Cal. Ct. i\pp. 1984); In re Dominic W., 426 A.2d 4:-32 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1981); In re T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934 (N.J. 1983) rev'd on other grounds 469 
U.S. 325 (1985); In re L., 280 N.W.2d :H3 (Wis. Ct. i\pp. 1979). 
130. 162 Cal. i\pp. iid at 540-12. 
131. Id. at 541. 
1:-32. /d. 
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improper acquisition happened to have been a high school 
campus. Arguably, it is more so. 133 
Therefore, the rule should be fully available in juvenile and 
criminal prosecutions when evidence is obtained in schools, by 
school officials, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 134 
In the case of In re William G., the California Supreme 
Court approved of the appellate court's reasoning and provided 
at least some reasoned analysis of its own for its application of 
the exclusionary rule. 135 After deciding that the evidence in the 
case was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
court decided: 
[T]he exclusionary rule is the only appropriate remedy for 
this violation when ... the evidence is sought to be admitted 
in a juvenile or criminal prosecution. The exclusionary rule is 
intended not only to have a deterrent effect on police 
misconduct, but to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
system .... [T]he exclusionary rule "gives to the individual no 
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the 
police officer no less than that to which honest law 
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial 
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. 136 
Therefore, it seemed that the most important rationale for 
the court's decision was that the exclusionary rule was 
important to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. 137 
The court did not consider the value of the deterrent effect 
rationale as it would apply to non-law-enforcement, like the 
school teacher or official. 
In similar reliance on Mapp v. Ohio, the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals decided in the case of In Re Dominic W. that 
the exclusionary rule did apply. 13s The court's reasons 
included: (1) a state education statute made it clear that the 
search was government action and that the school official in 
the case was an agent of the state, (2) the same state statute 
also required probable cause for such searches, and (3) the 
constitution compels the exclusionary rule because of Mapp u. 
133. ld. at 542. 
134. ld. 
135. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1298 (Cal. 19B5). 
136. ld. at 1298 n.17 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 613, 660 (1961)). 
137. See id. 
138. In re W., 426 A.2d 132, 134 (Md. Ct. Spec. i\pp. 1981). 
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Ohio. 139 However, other than merely citing to Mapp, the 
Maryland court did not explain why exactly it felt that the 
exclusionary rule was constitutionally compelled in this type of 
case, nor did it mention any of the general rationales behind 
the rule. 140 Interestingly, it seemed that the probable cause 
requirement imposed by the state statute blurred any 
distinction the court may have drawn between the school 
setting and normal law enforcement activities. 141 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided In Interest of L.L. 
and determined, with somewhat more substantial analysis, 
that the exclusionary rule applied in the case. 142 The court 
initially acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by using illegally obtained evidence in a 
criminal prosecution. 143 The court further stated that "[t]his 
prohibition or 'exclusionary rule' has been the principal method 
of ensuring that the constitutional guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures does not become an 
expression without substance." 144 The court then noted that the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that while 
"juvenile delinquency proceedings are not subject to all of the 
formal requirements of an adult criminal prosecution ... [they] 
need to provide the basic elements of due process." 145 The court 
determined that due process did not allow the use of such 
illegally obtained evidence because the exclusionary rule is one 
of the basic elements of due process, and the juvenile 
delinquency proceeding could result in a deprivation of 
liberty. 146 
Furthermore, the Wisconsin court criticized the Georgia 
Supreme Court for its analysis in State v. Young147-the 
primary case in the country that has rejected the application of 
the exclusionary rule to school searches-stating: 
1:39. /d. 
110. /d. 
111. See id. 
112. In re L., 90 Wis.2d 585,591-93 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
14:l. /d. at 592. 
144. /d. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12). 
115. !d. at 592 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)). 
116. /d. See also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-17 (rejecting the argument that since 
juvenile court proceedings were technically civil and not criminal, the normal 
Constitutional Due Process requirements did not apply). 
117. 216 S.K2d 586 (Ga. 1975). 
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Once the evidence comes into the possession of law 
enforcement officers and is used in court proceedings against 
the liberty interests of the person searched, the exclusionary 
rule must be available to deter prosecutions based on 
unlawful searches. Without such exclusions, school personnel 
and other government employees would become the same sort 
of bypass around the amendment's protections that the Court 
meant to close by extending the exclusionary rule to state 
court proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio. 148 
Thus, it seems that the Wisconsin court's primary 
rationales for adopting the exclusionary rule were that (1) it is 
the principal method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment and 
(2) due process guarantees that deprivations of liberty will not 
be justified by evidence that was obtained in violation of the 
Constitution. 149 
The only other known case that engages in any analysis in 
its consideration of the application of the exclusionary rule in 
juvenile proceedings is the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
opinion in In re T.L.0. 150 Before the United States Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in New Jersey u. T.L.O., the New 
Jersey Supreme Court had held that (1) the search at issue was 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and (2) the proper 
remedy was the exclusionary rule. 151 Since the United States 
Supreme Court reversed only on the New Jersey court's 
determination of whether the search was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the determination that the exclusionary 
rule is the proper remedy for such a violation still stands. 152 
In its analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
acknowledged that while some argue that the exclusionary rule 
should not apply because the basic purpose of Mapp u. Ohio 
was to deter law enforcement from committing constitutional 
violations, the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of 
Education not excepted." 153 Since the school officials are 
148. In re L., 90 Wis.2d at 593 n.l. 
149. See id. 
150. 463 A.2d 9:11. 
151. !d. at 938-39. 
152. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. :-l25, :i:33 n.:J (1985). 
153. In re T.L.O., 463 A.2d 931, 938-:19 (N .• J. 198:l) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 621, 637 (191il)). 
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governmental officials for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, 
the court rationalized: 
It is of little comfort to one charged in a law enforcement 
proceeding whether the public official who illegally obtained 
evidence was a municipal inspector, a firefighter, or school 
administrator or law enforcement official. We believe that the 
issue is settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and we 
accept the proposition that if an official search violates 
constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in 
criminal proceedings. 154 
The court found further support for its decision in a state 
statute that made the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures applicable to juvenile proceedings where 
"a juvenile is charged with an offense ... that would be a 
criminal offense if committed by an adult." 155 The decision on 
this issue, similar to the Wisconsin court in In re L., seemed to 
turn on the court's view that an individual's liberty right not to 
be prosecuted under evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is an absolute due process guarantee of the 
Constitution, no matter what type of governmental official does 
the violation. 156 
B. Cases That Have Not Applied the Exclusionary Rule 
Only few courts, with varying rationales, have rejected the 
exclusionary rule as a remedy to Fourth Amendment violations 
in schools. 157 Although they are apparently the minority view, 
these cases provide valuable and reasoned analysis and add to 
the quality of the discussion. 
United States v. Coles, although not technically a 
traditional public school case, nor a juvenile delinquency 
prosecution, provides an analogous situation. 158 The defendant, 
Coles, was a student or "corpsman" at a Civilian Conservation 
Center. 159 The Center was "one of the Job Corps centers 
151. !d. at gag (citations omitted). 
155. !d. at gag n.5. 
156. See id. at g:J8-8g. 
157. United States v. Coles, 802 F. Supp. gg (D. Me. 1g6g) (at Civilian 
Conservation Center); D.R.C. v. State, 616 1'.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1g82); State v. 
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1g75); State v. Wingerd, 818 N.K2d 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1g7 4) (college dorm room). 
158. Coles, 802 F. Supp. at 101-08. 
15g. !d. at 100. 
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established and operated by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity pursuant to the provisions of the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964." 160 This facility IS analogous to a 
public school because 
[t]he purpose of the Job Corps program is to provide, in a 
group setting, intensive programs of education, vocational 
training and work experience for low income, disadvantaged 
young men and women in order to assist them to become more 
responsible and productive citizens. In order to promote 
proper moral and disciplinary conditions at the centers, 
standards of conduct and deportment are to be provided, and 
the individual directors are given full authority to discipline 
the corpsmen. 161 
Additionally, the search at issue in the case "was conducted 
solely for the purpose of ensuring proper moral and disciplinary 
conditions at the Center, an obligation mandated by federal 
statute." 162 
The court in Coles decided that the exclusionary rule was 
not appropriate to apply in such an educational-facility type of 
setting. 163 This was because of the underlying rationale of the 
exclusionary rule as it was originally formulated by the 
Supreme Court164 was "to force law enforcement officers to 
observe Fourth Amendment rights." 165 Therefore, relying on its 
determinations that (1) the administrative officer at the center 
did not have the status or powers of a law enforcement officer, 
(2) the search was not conducted "at the behest of, or in 
cooperation with, any law enforcement officer," and (3) the 
object of the search was not to "procure evidence of a crime or 
in any way to facilitate an anticipated federal prosecution," the 
court decided: 
Under these circumstances it cannot be said that excluding 
the evidence seized by [the Administrative Officer of the 
Center] would improve standards of federal law enforcement, 
since [he] is neither a law enforcement officer not is he 
answerable to one. And exclusion in the present case could 
160. Id. at 101 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2701 (1968)). 
161. !d. at 101 (citations omitted). 
162. !d. at 102. 
16:3. Id. at 102-03. 
164. Jd. at 102 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. :i83 (1911)). 
165. Id. (citing Linkletter v. Walker, :i81 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
613 (1961)). 
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hardly be expected to affect the conduct of those, who ... are 
essentially unconcerned with the success of federal criminal 
prosecutions. 166 
689 
Therefore defendant's motion to suppress was denied, 
because the court viewed the exclusionary rule as primarily~ 
and historically~a deterrent for law enforcement. 167 No other 
exclusionary rule rationale was mentioned. 
In State v. Wingerd~also not a juvenile delinquency case~ 
an Ohio court decided that the exclusionary rule should not be 
applied to a search of a college dorm room by an official 
responsible for the operation of the residence hall. 168 However, 
the court assumed, without discussion, that the search was 
conducted by a private citizen, not a law enforcement 
agency. 169 Therefore, the court reasoned, the exclusionary rule 
is inappropriate because it was "fashioned 'to prevent and not 
repair,' and [its] target is official misconduct. [It is] 'to compel 
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way~by removing the incentive to disregard it.'" 170 It 
is unclear how the court would have differed had it found that 
the residence hall supervisor was a governmental actor for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 171 
The primary case in the country holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply as a remedy to 
unconstitutional school searches is a Georgia Supreme Court 
case, State v. Young. 172 The court decided that the search at 
issue did not violate the Fourth Amendment, but unlike the 
United States Supreme Court in T.L.O., 173 the Georgia court 
went ahead and decided "that the exclusionary would not apply 
even if the Fourth Amendment had been violated." 174 
In its analysis, the Georgia court noted that the 
exclusionary rule does not always apply when there is a Fourth 
Amendment violation, and the rule has not been used by the 
166. !d. at 10:1. 
16 7. See id. at 102-(J:l. 
168. 318 N.E.2d at 867-69. 
169. /d. at 869. 
170. !d. (quoting Coolidge v. N. H .• 103 U.S. 413, 488 (1971) (quoting Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))). 
171. See id. at 868-69. 
1 72. 216 S.K 2d 586. 
1 n. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 169 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1985). 
174. State v. Young, 216 S.K2d 586,588 (Ga. 1975). 
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Supreme Court in contexts other than violations by law 
enforcement officers. 175 Furthermore, the court recognized that 
the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule are not co-
extensive when it stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires 
only state action; the [exclusionary rule] requires state law 
enforcement action." 176 To determine the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment and exclusionary rule, "the proper test is a 
balancing test." 177 For the exclusionary rule, "the expected 
benefits and the expected detriments of applying the 
exclusionary rule must be weighed to determine whether that 
rule may be invoked to suppress the fruits of the search." 1n 
The court then boldly stated: 
There is nothing sacrosanct about the exclusionary rule; it is 
not embedded in the constitution and it is not a personal 
constitutional right: "In sum, the rule is a judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." 179 
Additionally, the opinion suggests that the attitude of the 
Supreme Court has shifted away from extending the 
exclusionary rule to additional contexts outside of the 
traditional law enforcement context. 180 The Supreme Court 
explained that the tragic flaw of the exclusionary rule has to do 
with who truly pays the price of excluding evidence: "It is well 
to remember that when incriminating evidence is found on a 
suspect and that evidence is then suppressed, 'the pain of 
suppression is felt, not by the inanimate State or by some 
penitent policemen, but by the offender's next victims."' 181 
The Court decided that for purposes of Fourth Amendment 
searches, there are three categories of actors: "private persons; 
governmental agents whose conduct is state action invoking 
the Fourth Amendment; and governmental law enforcement 
agents for whose violations of Fourth Amendment the 
exclusionary rule will be applied." 182 Public school officials are 
175. !d. at 589 (citing United States v. Calandra, 411 U.S. :3:38 (1971)). 
176. Jd. (emphasis added). 
177. !d. 
178. Jd. (citing Calandra, 414 U.S at 349). 
179. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Calandra, 114 U.S. at ilct8). 
180. Id. at 590. 
181. !d. (quoting In re G.C., 296 A.2d 102, 105 (N .• J. Union Cnty. Ct. 1972)). 
182. Jd. at 591. 
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therefore m the intermediate group, because they are state 
actors for Fourth Amendment purposes, but not law 
enforcement officials. 183 Finally, justified by the principles that 
(1) "the exclusionary rule does not reach as far as does the 
Fourth Amendment," (2) the rule has only been applied to law 
enforcement action, and (3) "the tide is turning ... away from 
the exclusionary rule," the court held that the exclusionary rule 
is not a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations committed by 
school officials. 184 Further justifying this holding, the court 
recognizes that students still have other remedies to pursue if 
their Fourth Amendment rights are violated, such as civil 
rights or tort actions seeking damages. 185 
In the latest known case in which a court held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply, an Alaska court in D.R.C. v. 
State based its holding on somewhat different grounds. 186 Even 
though the court's determination that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to the actions of school officials 187 has since been 
overruled by the Supreme Court, 188 the discussion of the 
purposes of behind the exclusionary rule is valuable. 189 
In its discussion of the exclusionary rule, the court noted 
the rule's purpose: "[t]he enforcement of school regulations, the 
safeguarding of students during school hours through 
confiscation of weapons and other contraband, and the 
maintenance of a drug-free learning environment provide 
substantial incentives to 'search' that would not be lessened by 
the suppression of evidence at a subsequent delinquency 
proceeding." 190 The court further draws upon analysis from a 
law review article and states: 
As Ziff points out in his note, "[F]or the exclusionary rule to 
be an effective deterrent, the party committing the search 
must have foreknowledge of an exclusionary rule plus a 
substantial interest in seeing that a conviction is obtained." 
While school officials may search frequently enough to 
warrant their understanding the applicable rules, they are 
18il. /d. 
184. /d. 
185. /d. 
186. 616 1'.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
187. /d. at 256 n.9. 
188. 169 U.S. at aa6. 
189. See /J.R.C., 616 1'.2d at 258--61. 
190. /d. at 258 (citation omitted). 
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primarily concerned with maintaining internal discipline 
rather than obtaining convictions. 191 
The court also reasoned that the historic application of the 
Fourth Amendment is to (1) "investigations of those suspected 
of crime by those performing the function of police officers," and 
(2) the "area-wide exploratory investigations, with or without a 
suspect, carried out by specialized law enforcement officers in 
order to prevent crime (including violation of health and safety 
regulations)," and the school fits neither of those situations. 192 
Overall, the court seemed to rely heavily on the fact that school 
officials are not looking to "ferret out criminals," but are simply 
trying to maintain school discipline, therefore, the deterrent 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment would not be served by 
applying the exclusionary rule in such a setting. 193 
C. Summary of Courts' Rationales 
In summary, the rationales used by the courts applying the 
exclusionary rule have been, essentially: (1) the rule is 
necessary to preserve judicial integrity, 194 (2) constitutional 
due process guarantees citizens the right not to be deprived of 
liberty based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, no matter what kind of government official 
performs the illegal search, 195 and (3) it is the principal method 
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. 196 Conversely, the 
rationales used by courts deciding not to apply the rule have 
generally and essentially been: (1) the primary goal and history 
of the rule is deterrence, which is a poor fit for the school 
setting since school officials, although state actors, are not law 
enforcement officers trying to ferret out crime, 197 (2) the 
school's need to maintain safety and discipline makes the cost 
191. Id. at 258 n.10 (quoting Harvey L. Ziff, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion 
in Criminal Cases, 19 :STAN. L. REV. 608, 614 (1967)). 
192. Id. at 260. 
193. See id. 
194. See In re G., 709 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1985). 
195. See Gordon v. Santa Ana Unified Sch. Dist., 162 Cal. App. :-ld 580 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984); In re W., 426 A.2d 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); In re T.L.O., 163 A.2d 9.'31 
(N.J. 1983); In re L., 280 N.W.2d :-34:-3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). 
196. See In reG., 709 P.2d 1287; In re L., 280 N.W.2d 31:3. 
197. See United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D. Me. 1969); D.R.C., 646 P.2d 
252; State v. Young, 216 S.K2d 586 (Ga. 1975); State v. Wingerd, 318 N.K2d 866 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1974). 
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of having the rule too high, 198 (3) the rule is not a constitutional 
right, it is merely a judicially created remedy that does not 
reach as far as does the Fourth Amendment. 199 
D. Additional Discussion from Scholarly Sources 
In addition to what rationales various courts have relied on 
in their rulings regarding the applicability of the exclusionary 
rule to juvenile and criminal proceedings based on evidence 
seized in a school by a school official, some scholars have 
participated in the discussion. These publications have injected 
their own assessments, as well as arguments for and against 
the application of the rule. 
Of the existing scholarly publications that actually argue a 
position on the issue, virtually all argue that the exclusionary 
rule should apply in juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceedings when the evidence is obtained by a school official 
(assuming no police involvement)200 in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 201 Others simply discuss the likelihood of the 
198. See Young, 216 S.E.2d 586. 
199. See id. 
200. In its T.L.O. opinion, the Supreme Court deliberately left undecided the issue 
of how school searches should be treated for Fourth Amendment purposes when 
conducted with involvement by law enforcement. 469 U.S. at 342 n.7 ("We here 
consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own 
authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for 
assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at 
the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question."). 
Although there are virtually no clear lines and plenty of gray areas, courts that have 
addressed the issue of police involvement in the school search have generally held the 
law enforcement to a higher standard of suspicion if the search was at the direction of 
law enforcement rather than the school official. See, e.g., M .• J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court held that the search required probable cause because 
police officer acted in concert with school official in questioning and threatening 
student until student gave up concealed contraband); Picha v. Wielgus, 410 F. Supp. 
1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (search had to be based on probable cause because police caused 
school officials to perform the search). But see, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 
(6th Cir. 1984) (level of suspicion was not raised from reasonable suspicion to probable 
because the mere presence of police did not raise the standard when school official were 
not acting on any direction of the police). 
201. See, e.g., William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students 
in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 741-42 n.20 (1974); Gerald S. Reamey, New 
,Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
933, 91:3 (1985); Brenda Jones Walts, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Questions the Court 
/Jid Not Answer About School Searches, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 421, 430-33 (1985); Charles 
W. Hardin, Jr., Comment, Searching Public Schools: T.L.O. and the Exclusionary Rule, 
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1099, 1109-14 (1986); Deborah A. Reperowitz, Note, School Officials 
May Conduct Searches Upon Satisfaction of Reasonableness Test in Order to Maintain 
Educational Environment, 14 SETON HALL L. REV 738 (1984); Ronald L. Vance, 
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Supreme Court's future acceptance of the rule,2°2 or argue for 
an alternative approach.203 
One main point of argument concerning the exclusionary 
rule's applicability has to do with the deterrence rationale. The 
basic notion of the rationale is that applying the exclusionary 
rule in juvenile delinquency or criminal proceedings to evidence 
seized by school officials in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
will deter school officials from future violations by removing 
their incentives to engage in unlawful searches.204 
Some argue that even if the deterring effect of the 
exclusionary rule on school officials is uncertain, it still 
remains the best remedy because all of the existing 
alternatives are found wanting or impractical.205 Others argue 
that the exclusionary rule would not deter constitutional 
violations in schools because the relationship between school 
officials and students is too unlike the police-criminal 
relationship, that is, the school official's primary duty is to 
educate students, not catch criminals.206 One scholar noted: 
Comment, School Search-The Supreme Court"s Adoption of a "Rea8onable Su8picion'" 
Standard in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and the Hei{fhtened Need for Extension of the 
Exclusionary Rule to School Search Cases, 10 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 271-82 (1985). 
202. Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Door Left Open: Applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Juvenile Court Delinquency Hearing<;, 21 AM . • ]. 
CIUM. L. 29 (1996). 
203. J. Chad Mitchell, Comment, An Alternative Approach to the Fourth 
Amendment in Public Schools: Balancin{f Students' Ri{fhts with School Safety, 1998 
llYU L. REV. 1207, 1230-10 (1998). 
204. See Buss, supra note 201, at 741-42 n.20; Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 38-
42; Walts, supra note 201, at 131-32; Hardin, supra note 201, at 1110-12; Mitchell, 
supra note 203, at 1225-27; Vance, supra note 201, at 276-78. 
205. See Buss, supra note 201, at 7 42 n.20 (alternative methods have been less 
than effective at deterring police); Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 11-2 (as a practical 
matter, other remedies may not be available); Mitchell, supra note 20:3, at 1227-28 
(other remedies are practically foreclosed); Vance, supra note 201, at 279-81 
(alternative methods of enforcement pose too many difficulties for students to be a 
viable remedy). 
206. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 1225 (citing United States v. Janis, 128 U.S. 1:>:3, 
450-52 (1976); Dallin H. Oaks, Studyin{f the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970)) ("The teacher's goal is to educate, encourage and help 
their students, far different from that of a police officer's goals to thwart and 
apprehend suspected criminals. Since no accurate empirical data exists as to whether 
the exclusionary rule actually works in the criminal setting, the student-teacher 
relationship casts even more doubt upon the rule's deterrent effects among this type of 
non-adversarial relationship."). See also Hardin, supra note 201, at 1111 ("[AJ teacher 
is not likely to be thinking very much about a juvenile delinquency or a criminal 
proceeding, and his or her behavior is not likely to he influenced very much by the 
admissibility of the evidence in such proceedings."). 
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On the one hand, it can be argued that school administrators 
care only about the safety of students and teachers, and 
therefore they would continue to search students to retrieve 
drugs and weapons regardless of whether that evidence could 
be legally used in juvenile court. On the other hand, such 
students may present serious disciplinary problems, and 
administrators may want them removed from school. One 
way to facilitate such a result is to make legal searches so 
that the evidence can be used in juvenile court, which may 
result in placement of the child away from the home. Viewed 
in this manner, the deterrent impact is heightened, for the 
school administrator is much like a police officer who wants a 
criminal off the streets. 207 
695 
However, with the relatively recent influx of school 
disciplinary "zero-tolerance" policies, it is more likely that a 
student would be subject to an automatic long-term removal 
from school for certain offenses, therefore the school's interest 
in and need for the juvenile delinquency proceeding's success in 
the removal of the student is much less or virtually gone.208 
Additionally, some argue that an important factor when 
determining the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule is 
whether the rule is necessary to inform the officials of their 
207. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 39. See also Hardin, supra note 201, at 1111 
("While having students stand trial may not be preeminent in the minds of school 
officials, it is this author's view that school authorities will be deterred from engaging 
in unconstitutional conduct by application of the exclusionary rule. With widespread 
drug abuse and increased instances of violent crime currently plaguing American 
schools, teachers and other school authorities have a keen interest in obtaining the just 
punishment of those students who engage in such activities. Given this motivation, it 
seems unlikely that a teacher would engage in an unlawful search knowing that such 
conduct could jeopardize, if not preclude, the punishment of a wayward student."). But 
see Rosenburg, supra note 202, at 40 ("since [school] officials could get student removed 
from school in a disciplinary proceeding in which illegally seized evidence is used, then 
presumably they would not be deterred by applying the exclusionary rule in juvenile 
court unless they wanted the child removed from the community or at least from school 
for a long time and a school disciplinary proceeding could not accomplish such a 
result."). 
208. See, e.g, Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)Tolerance Policies? Weaponless 
School Violence, Due Process, and the Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An 
Examination of Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District, 
2002 BYU Enuc. & L.J. 159, 162-63 (2002) ("When the Gun-Free Schools Act was 
enacted, it required each state to enforce both a one-year expulsion for any student who 
brings a firearm to school and a referral to the local criminal or juvenile justice system. 
Shortly after the passage of the Act in 1991, local school boards and administrators 
began to exercise wide discretion in the use of zero tolerance policies, and they applied 
these zero tolerance laws not only to other weapons (i.e. knives), but also to the 
possession or use of drugs, alcohol, tobacco, and a host of other student behaviors that 
many would argue cause no serious threats or safety concerns to schools."). 
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errors, "[t]herefore, without the exclusionary rule there may be 
no effective means of informing school officials of their Fourth 
Amendment mistakes and assuring that such errors are not 
repeated."209 But given the uncertainty of the true deterring 
effect of the exclusionary rule on law enforcement in general,2 10 
it seems to defy logic that such an uncertain effect on school 
officials would be an adequate rationale for adoption of the rule 
in the school context.211 Furthermore, since the Supreme 
Court's preeminent justification for invoking the exclusionary 
rule has by far been the deterrence rationale,212 application of 
the rule when the deterring effect is so uncertain seems even 
more unlikely and illogical. 
Another rationale for the exclusionary rule is that the rule 
is necessary to preserve judicial integrity. This rationale 
"generally refers to the need for the judiciary to refrain from 
associating itself with and thus apparently approving of the 
government's use of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal 
prosecution."213 Some argue that this concept presents a more 
compelling reason for the exclusionary rule in the context of 
schools, since students are taught by example and therefore 
may lose respect for the judiciary and government when they 
feel treated unfairly.214 
However, it seems more likely that young students with 
less than adult understandings of government would take 
notice of when a fellow student "gets off' on a technicality when 
he or she really was guilty of the violation. This apparent 
injustice teaches the wrong, but unintended, lesson to young 
students. Therefore, appropriately, some argue that it is not 
209. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 41-42. 
210. Oaks, supra note 206, at 669-78. 
211. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 42 (the fact that school officials are not 
police officers creates the uncertainty of the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule 
on school officials). 
212. Stephen K. Sharpe & John E. Fennelly, Commentary, Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard; When the Keeper Leads the Flock Astray-A Case of Good Faith or Harmless 
Error?, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 665, 671 (1984). 
213. Mitchell, supra note 20:3, at 1228. See also Hardin, supra note 201, at 1112 
("This concept embodies the notion that it is wrong in itself for a court to sanction the 
use of evidence that has been unlawfully seized, or to use Justice Stewart's words, the 
'federal courts [should not] be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution 
they are sworn to uphold.' If courts permit 'official lawlessness' by allowing the state's 
used of tainted evidence, they risk the loss of support and invite disrespect and 
anarchy."). 
214. Hardin, supra note 201, at 1112; Mitchell, supra note 20il, at 1228-30; Vance, 
supra note 201, at 278-79. 
2] NEW JERSEY V T.L. 0. 697 
right for a student to go free from punishment when they are 
obviously guilty of possessing contraband.215 In any event, 
proponents using the judicial integrity rationale seem to ignore 
the Supreme Court's treatment of it in Stone v. Powell: "While 
courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the 
integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force 
as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative 
evidence."216 
It is also argued that implementation of the exclusionary 
rule compromises school safety. The notion is that because the 
rule may prohibit the removal of a dangerous student, the rule 
would allow students to go unpunished for breaking laws and 
school rules, and it would produce a "chilling effect on effective 
disciplinary enforcement" by causing school officials to refrain 
from searching in some appropriate but possibly doubtful 
circumstances for fear of having the evidence eventually 
excluded. 217 
As alluded to above, it is emphasized by some that the 
exclusionary rule is the only realistic way to provide protection 
for student's Fourth Amendment rights.218 Conversely, some 
say that extending the rule to the school context is not 
necessary because there are already adequate alternatives for 
enforcement, such as civil rights lawsuits against the school 
and/or the school official(s).219 It is argued: 
Critics of the exclusionary rule who assert that the use of civil 
suits . . . will adequately deter unreasonable searches of 
students by public school officials overlook the difficulties in 
pursuing these remedies and the historic failure of these 
alternatives to protect students' rights. Among other 
difficulties in bringing civil suits against public school officials 
are the following: 1) fear of reprisals; 2) jury prejudice in favor 
215. Walts, supra note 201, at 131 nA6 (New Jersey's Deputy Attorney General 
Allan J. Nodes believes that "applying the rule is inappropriate even though a search is 
based on less than reasonable suspicion if some type of illegal contraband is discovered 
because the improper search and seizure does not negate the fact that the student is 
guilty of having possessed the contraband. lf that evidence is suppressed in an effort to 
make up for the improper seizure then the student will possibly avoid punishment or 
prosecution .... '[Tjwo wrongs do not make a right,' and ... letting the guilty student 
go free because he was illegally searched is improper."). 
216. 428 U.S.165, 185 (1976). 
217. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 122:1-21 (citations omitted). See also Vance, supra 
note 201, at 275. 
218. Mitchell, supra note 203, at 1227-28; Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 41-42. 
219. Vance, supra note 201, at 275-76. 
698 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2011 
of government officials; 3) prohibitive litigation costs, and 
because of the dim prospects for success, the likely 
unavailability of securing legal representation on a 
contingency fee basis; 4) ignorance that the official conduct 
was illegal or actionable; and 5) the likelihood of low damage 
awards absent physical harm to the claimant. Furthermore, 
teachers and school administrators have a qualified immunity 
from damages for claims of constitutional violations stemming 
from their "good faith" actions. 220 
Furthermore, one scholar, while noting the low likelihood 
that a school official would ever be subjected to any substantial 
civil liability, boldly stated, "[t]hey might as well decide that 
students have no protection under the Fourth Amendment, 
because the removal of the exclusionary rule could 
unquestionably have that effect.'>22 1 
While proponents make their arguments and hope that the 
Supreme Court will apply the exclusionary rule in the school 
search context,222 some predict that such a prospect is grim.223 
One scholar posited that in light of Court precedent dealing 
with the exclusionary rule, several factors, such as the fact that 
school officials are not police officers, the uncertainness of the 
deterring impact of the exclusionary rule, and the Court's 
inclination to grant school officials broad latitude to maintain 
school safety and appropriate student conduct, the Court is not 
likely to see the exclusionary rule as appropriate in such a 
setting.224 
In sum, scholars and others disagree about which way the 
basic rationales underlying the exclusionary rule pull when 
applied to juvenile delinquency and criminal proceedings 
stemming from unconstitutional school searches. However, it is 
apparent that most of the primary stated justifications for the 
exclusionary rule could arguably be used by either side in 
support for their respective positions. Overall, it seems that the 
most reasonable and likely answer is that the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied in a juvenile delinquency or criminal 
proceeding when the search was conducted in a school and by a 
school official acting on his or her own authority. This 
220. !d. at 279-80. 
221. Walts, supra note 201, at 1il:3. 
222. Id. 
223. Rosenberg, supra note 202, at 42-1:3. 
224. Id. 
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conclusion is most reasonable in light of the primacy of the 
deterrence rationale in Supreme Court precedent and the 
uncertainty of the deterring value that the exclusionary rule 
would have on school officials since they are not law 
enforcement officers engaged in the business of ferreting out 
crime. 225 Additional support for this conclusion is found in the 
Court's apparent disfavor of the "judicial integrity" rationale226 
and the fact that the Court acknowledges that the exclusionary 
rule does not extend as far as does the Fourth Amendment.227 
The Court has referred to the rule as merely a "judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."228 Also, 
there are other remedies that remain available as a deterrent 
for serious violations.229 There is also a high societal cost in 
school safety and discipline from having the rule. 23° Finally, 
the Court has consistently treated schools as "special" in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment.231 In light of these 
considerations, it seems most reasonable that the exclusionary 
rule should not and would not apply. In any event, the prospect 
for the Supreme Court's decision on this issue is uncertain. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the New Jersey v. T.L. 0. majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court purposefully left open certain questions and issues. One 
of the most important questions is the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in juvenile delinquency and criminal 
proceedings when the evidence has been seized in school, by a 
school official, in violation of the Fourth Amendment standard 
announced in the opinion itself. By leaving this question open, 
courts across the country, both before and after T.L.O., have 
reached varying conclusions on the issue. The various 
rationales have also differed, and there are valid arguments for 
both sides. Although it appears that the majority of scholarly 
225. See supra notes 207-215 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra notes 216-219 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
228. United States v. Calandra, 111 U.S. 338, 319 (1971). 
229. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra Section II. 
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publications and cases argue for the application of the rule in 
the school search context, the same stated justifications and 
rationales have also been used by others to argue against the 
application of the rule. While not without valid arguments to 
the contrary, it seems most reasonable that the exclusionary 
should not apply in juvenile delinquency and criminal 
proceedings when the evidence is based on a school search 
conducted by a school official in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. In any event, due to the Court's pattern of 
treating the school environment in unique and sometimes 
unpredictable ways as it pertains to constitutional rights, the 
predictions about the Court's possible resolution of this 
question are not without hesitance and qualification. The 
future of the exclusionary rule in the school context is, at the 
very least, unclear. 
Bryan Stoddard 
